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Pharmacists and the “Morning-After Pill”: 
Creating Room for Conscience Behind the Counter 
Tony J. Kriesel* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A woman walks into her local pharmacy, where she has 
been a customer for years, to fill what she believes to be a 
routine prescription for birth control.  The pharmacist, after 
perusing the doctor’s drug choice, takes a deep breath, looks the 
customer in the eye, and says, “Sorry, my conscience does not 
allow me to fill this.  Please take it elsewhere.” 
What prompts the pharmacist’s unusual response?  Is birth 
control no longer legal?  Does the Constitution no longer 
guarantee the fundamental right to contraception?  While such 
questions might be racing through the woman’s mind, a closer 
look reveals that this is no routine prescription for birth 
control.  Rather, the doctor prescribed a particular type of drug, 
commonly called the “morning-after pill” or “emergency 
contraception,” which women take within seventy-two hours of 
sexual intercourse to prevent pregnancy beyond administration 
of the drug.1 
A scientific controversy surrounding the effect of the drug 
prompts the pharmacist’s unexpected response: some argue the 
drug simply prevents pregnancy, much like a condom or other 
ordinary contraception,2 while others, such as the pharmacist 
above, believe it terminates a pregnancy, effectively making the 
drug an abortion.3  By choosing not to fill the prescription, the 
                                                          
       ©    2005 Tony J. Kriesel. 
       * J.D. expected 2006, University of Minnesota Law School. 
 1. See generally Felicia Stewart, James Trussel & Paul F.A. Van Look, 
Emergency Contraception, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 279-303 (18th rev. 
ed. 2004) (describing the history, methods, effectiveness, advantages, 
disadvantages, and other issues regarding emergency contraception). 
 2. See David A. Grimes & Elizabeth G. Raymond, Emergency 
Contraception, 137 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. E-180, E-182 (2002). 
 3. See Stephanie Simon, Illinois Drugstores Required to Fill 
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pharmacist exercises her right to not participate in that 
procedure. 
This scenario has played out in many pharmacies across 
the country,4 prompting a variety of political,5 legal,6 and moral 
responses.7  Proponents of the customer’s right to free access of 
the drug argue the patient’s autonomy as a consumer of drugs 
should prevail,8 and the Constitution’s fundamental right to 
contraception protects that autonomy.9  In contrast, supporters 
of the pharmacist’s right to conscience cite the free exercise 
clause of the First Amendment10 and the pharmacist’s 
particular role in patient health care.11  Consequently, the 
                                                          
Prescriptions for Contraceptives, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005, at A15. 
 4. See Rene Sanchez, New Arena for Birth-Control Battle, STAR TRIB., 
May 3, 2005, at A1, A10 (reporting that while the exact number of emergency 
contraception refusals nationwide is unknown, both sides of the debate say it 
is happening more often and predict it will increase). 
 5. See, e.g., Monica Davey & Pam Belluck, Pharmacies Balk on After-Sex 
Pill and Widen Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at A1 (stating that some 
state legislators are proposing laws that allow pharmacists to refuse filling 
prescriptions to which they are opposed, while others are proposing laws that 
require pharmacists to dispense any legal prescription for birth control). 
 6. See, e.g., Eric Noe, Some Pharmacists Have Triggered Legal Battles by 
Refusing to Fill Contraceptive Prescriptions, ABC NEWS, May 3, 2005, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/LegalCenter/story?id=701109&page=1 
(documenting Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s directive requiring 
pharmacists to dispense any valid prescriptions for the morning-after pill, as 
well as the legal challenge against the order). 
 7. See, e.g., Erik A. McClave, A Catholic Pharmacist’s Struggle, 
TCRNEWS, http://tcrnews2.com/pharmacy.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) 
(describing the pharmacist author’s frustration and guilt in dispensing drugs 
that are contrary to his religious and moral beliefs). 
 8. See Stephanie E. Harvey et al., Do Pharmacists Have the Right to 
Refuse to Dispense a Prescription Based on Personal Beliefs?,  http://www.nm-
pharmacy.com/body_rights.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). 
 9. See Yuliya Fisher Schaper, Emergency Contraception for Rape 
Victims: A New Face of the Old Battleground of Legal Issues in the Bipartisan 
Abortion Politics in the United States, 29 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 9 (2005). 
 10. See Correy E. Stephenson, Health Care Providers Refusing Treatment 
Based on Religious Beliefs, KAN. CITY DAILY REC., Apr. 26, 2005, at 1, 2 (“In 
this country, we decided from the beginning to respect and accommodate the 
free exercise of religion . . . .” (quoting Francis J. Manion, attorney at the 
American Center for Law & Justice)). 
 11. See Hearing on H.B. 2711 Before the S. Public Health & Welfare 
Comm., 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ks. 2002), available at 
http://www.pfli.org/PKoch_Testimony_KS_Senate2002.html [hereinafter Koch 
testimony] (testimony of Paula Koch) (testifying in support of a bill that would 
allow pharmacists to conscientiously object to filling some prescriptions, that 
the pharmacist is part of “the health care team” and not simply a “conduit of 
the physician’s wishes”). 
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controversy becomes a clash of constitutional rights, only one of 
which may prevail. 
Part II of this article argues that emergency contraception 
is an abortion, and the pharmacist is within her right in 
denying access to the drug.  Part III demonstrates that even if 
emergency contraception is not an abortion, there is still no 
right to have a prescription for the drug filled at any pharmacy 
a woman chooses.  Part IV addresses state laws that compel 
pharmacists to dispense drugs, regardless of their conscientious 
objections.  This discussion leads to the conclusion that the 
pharmacist may legally and constitutionally refuse to fill a 
prescription for emergency contraception. 
II. THE PRIMARY AREA OF CONTENTION: IS 
EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION AN ABORTION? 
Emergency contraception, which is relatively new to the 
market,12 operates differently than other types of 
contraception.  What makes this drug different from a condom 
or the birth control pill, and why do some people view 
dispensing emergency contraception as equivalent to assisting 
in the procurement of an abortion? 
A.  EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION: A DIFFERENT KIND OF 
CONTRACEPTION 
The most popular methods of contraception in the United 
States are implemented before sexual intercourse, preventing 
the fertilization of the woman’s egg.13  In contrast, emergency 
                                                          
 12. See Stewart, Trussel & Van Look, supra note 1, at 280 (recounting 
that two products, Preven and Plan B, used specifically for emergency 
contraception, were approved by the FDA in 1998 and 1999, respectively).  
Preven was withdrawn from the market in 2004, making Plan B the sole 
emergency contraceptive product.  Id. 
 13. See James Trussell, The Essentials of Contraception: Efficacy, Safety, 
and Personal Considerations, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, 
at 221, 222 (stating that the four most popular contraception methods in the 
United States are female sterilization, oral contraceptive pills, male condoms, 
and male sterilization).  Female sterilization cuts or blocks the fallopian tube, 
preventing the sperm and egg from uniting.  See Amy E. Pollack, Charles S. 
Carignan & Roy Jacobstein, Female and Male Sterilization, in 
CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 531, 532.  Oral pills block the 
luteinizing hormone surge, which inhibits ovulation.  See Robert A. Hatcher & 
Anita Nelson, Combined Hormonal Contraceptive Methods, in CONTRACEPTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 391, 392.  The male condom acts as a physical 
barrier to prevent the passage of semen.  See Lee Warner, Robert A. Hatcher 
& Markus J. Steine, Male Condoms, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra 
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contraception is taken after intercourse, when other methods of 
contraception were either not used or may not have been 
effective.14  Also referred to as the “morning-after pill” and 
“postcoital contraception,” “emergency contraception” has 
emerged as the preferred medical term, as it prevents the false 
impression that it must be taken the morning after sex and 
emphasizes that it should not be an ongoing contraception 
method.15 
Plan B is the only drug currently marketed as emergency 
contraception.16  While several other drugs, used in proper 
dosages, can have the same effect as Plan B,17 the latter 
remains the only drug specifically marketed for “contraceptive 
emergencies.”18  To be effective, two doses of the drug must be 
taken, the second dose twelve hours after the first.19  While 
most studies have shown emergency contraception must be 
taken within seventy-two hours of sexual intercourse, the drug 
may still be effective for up to 120 hours.20 
Depending upon where the woman is in her menstrual 
cycle, emergency contraception can have several effects.  When 
taken prior to ovulation, emergency contraception prevents 
fertilization,21 similar to other common forms of contraception.  
When taken during ovulation, however, studies have shown the 
development of a receptive uterine lining can be altered.22  This 
alteration may prevent a fertilized egg from implanting in the 
woman’s uterus,23 thereby ending further development of the 
egg.  It is this effect that concerns abortion opponents. 
                                                          
note 1, at 331, 332.  Male sterilization, or vasectomy, blocks the vasa 
deferentia, preventing the passage of sperm into the ejaculated seminal fluid.  
See Pollack, Carignan & Jacobstein, supra, at 533. 
 14. See Grimes & Raymond, supra note 2, at E-180. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Stewart, Trussel & Van Look, supra note 1, at 280. 
 17. See id. at tbl.12-1. 
 18. Id.  Insertion of a copper-releasing intrauterine device (IUD) may also 
be used as emergency contraception.  See id. at 285-86.  It is not, however, 
implicated in the current debate upon which this article focuses. 
 19. See Grimes & Raymond, supra note 2, at E-180 to E-181. 
 20. See Stewart, Trussel & Van Look, supra note 1, at 285. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
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B. THE BIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR EMERGENCY 
CONTRACEPTION’S ABORTIFACIENT EFFECT 
Human development begins with the fertilization of the 
egg by the sperm.24  At fertilization, embryonic development 
begins.25  The term “embryo” describes the first eight weeks of 
human development.26  The single cell created by fertilization is 
called a zygote,27 which is genetically unique because both 
mother and father contribute half the chromosomes that make 
up the cell.28  At this point, the gender of the unborn child has 
been determined.29  These biological facts support the 
contention that pregnancy begins when the egg and sperm 
fuse.30 
This assertion is contradicted by popular use of the word 
“pre-embryo” to describe the period between fertilization and 
implantation in the uterus.31  The origin of this term, however, 
is less than scientific.  First defined in 1986, “pre-embryo” was 
initially used in the United States and the United Kingdom for 
public policy reasons related to in vitro fertilization.32  The 
term was needed to alleviate moral concerns regarding the 
status of the fertilized egg prior to implantation in the uterus.33  
Prior to 1986, the term “embryo” described the developing 
human beginning at the time of conception.34 
An abortion is a premature stoppage of the development of 
                                                          
 24. See, e.g., BRUCE M. CARLSON, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY AND 
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 2 (2d ed. 1999); KEITH L. MOORE & T.V.N. 
PERSAUD, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN: CLINICALLY ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY 34 
(6th ed. 1998); RONAN O’RAHILLY & FABIOLA MÜLLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 
AND TERATOLOGY 31 (3d ed. 2001). 
 25. See CARLSON, supra note 24, at 2; WILLIAM J. LARSEN, HUMAN 
EMBRYOLOGY 1 (2d ed. 1997); MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 24, at 2. 
 26. See CARLSON, supra note 24, at xv; LARSEN, supra note 25, at xv-xvi.  
The term “fetus” is used to describe development from eight weeks to birth.  
See CARLSON, supra note 24, at xvi-xvii. 
 27. MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 24, at 2. 
 28. Id. at 37. 
 29. See CARLSON, supra note 24, at 32; MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 24, 
at 37. 
 30. See CARLSON, supra note 24, at 2. 
 31. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1078 (3d ed. 
1993). 
 32. See J.D. Biggers, Arbitrary Partitions of Prenatal Life, 5 HUM. 
REPROD. 1, 3-5 (1990) (suggesting the term was used to facilitate a discussion 
on the moral status of the “early prenatal human organism”). 
 33. See id. at 4. 
 34. Id. at 1. 
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the embryo or fetus before viability.35  If one accepts the 
medical understanding that pregnancy begins at fertilization, 
then when emergency contraception prevents a fertilized egg 
from implanting in the uterus, this leads to an abortion.36  This 
is the reason why medical doctors have said emergency 
contraception can be abortifacient,37 and some state 
legislatures have attempted to define abortion as the 
termination of a pregnancy anytime after fertilization.38  
Moreover, this argument is the reason why pharmacists all 
across the country are refusing to fill prescriptions for 
emergency contraception. 
C.  LIMITATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN 
ABORTION 
While it is easy to understand why abortion opponents are 
opposed to the use of emergency contraception, supporters of 
free access to emergency contraception suggest that such 
opposition is legally irrelevant.  It is argued that even if the 
drug is abortifacient, the Constitution protects a woman’s right 
to an abortion.39  To interpret this protection as grounds to 
compel pharmacists to provide abortions, however, is to extend 
the right too far.  The Supreme Court has never suggested the 
right to an abortion means a pregnant woman has the right to 
receive an abortion from any doctor whom she chooses or at any 
                                                          
 35. MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 24, at 3. 
 36. See id. at 532. 
 37. See, e.g., MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 24, at 532 (“[Morning-after 
pills] prevent implantation, not fertilization. . . . [T]hey should not be called 
contraceptive pills.  Conception occurs but the blastocyst does not implant. . . . 
Because the term abortion refers to premature stoppage of a pregnancy, the 
term abortion could be applied to such an early termination of a pregnancy.”); 
Davey & Belluck, supra note 5, at A16 (“Emergency contraceptive pills can be 
abortifacient if they are taken after ovulation has occurred.” (quoting Dr. 
Gertrude Murphy, M.D.)). 
 38. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.1(1) (West 1979) (defining 
abortion as “the deliberate termination of a human pregnancy after 
fertilization of a female ovum”).  In Margaret S. v. Edwards, the plaintiff 
argued this definition was impermissibly vague, as it could implicate the 
morning-after pill.  Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 190-91 (E.D. 
La. 1980). 
 39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“[A] right of privacy, whether it 
be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty . . . or . 
. . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy”); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) 
(affirming Roe’s essential holdings). 
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clinical setting she might choose.  In fact, the Court has 
explicitly stated otherwise. 
In Doe v. Bolton,40 a companion case to Roe v. Wade,41 a 
Georgia statute was challenged that, in part, required a 
committee of at least three hospital staff members to approve of 
an abortion before the procedure could be administered.42  In 
striking down the provision, the Court speculated that the 
reason for the provision was, perhaps, to protect the hospital 
itself, rather than out of concern for the woman’s need to make 
an informed decision.43  In response to the hospital’s speculated 
concern, the Court stated, “the hospital is free not to admit a 
patient for an abortion. . . . Further a physician or any other 
employee has the right to refrain, for moral or religious 
reasons, from participating in the abortion procedure.”44 
Sixteen years later in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services,45 the Court made an even more direct pronouncement 
on an individual’s right not to participate in the abortion 
procedure.  At issue was a Missouri statute that prohibited any 
public employee in the state from performing or assisting in an 
abortion, unless the procedure was necessary to save the 
mother’s life.46  In upholding the statute, the Court observed: 
Missouri’s refusal to allow public employees to perform abortions in 
public hospitals leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if 
the State had chosen not to operate any public hospitals at all.  The 
challenged provisions only restrict a woman’s ability to obtain an 
abortion to the extent that she chooses to use a physician affiliated 
with a public hospital.47 
In short, a state is not constitutionally required to provide 
facilities and physicians for abortions.  In the same opinion, the 
Court further stated that “[n]othing in the Constitution 
requires States to enter or remain in the business of performing 
abortions.  Nor . . . do private physicians and their patients 
have some kind of constitutional right of access to public 
facilities for the performance of abortions.”48 
                                                          
 40. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
 41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 42. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 183-84. 
 43. See id. at 197. 
 44. Id. at 197-98. 
 45. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 46. Id. at 507. 
 47. Id. at 509. 
 48. Id. at 510. 
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Moreover, the Court has never suggested there is a 
constitutional obligation for private doctors or facilities to 
provide abortion services.  In Doe, the Court did not question 
the constitutionality of the Georgia statute provision allowing 
all physicians and hospitals, public and private, to refrain from 
the abortion procedure.49  Poelker v. Doe,50 decided four years 
after Roe and Doe, lends further support to this proposition.  
There, the Court upheld a directive by a city mayor to disallow 
abortions in the two city hospitals, except when the mother’s 
health was in serious danger.51  Justice Brennan, in his 
dissent, expressed disapproval toward the ruling, largely due to 
his concern that women seeking abortions might not have a 
private clinical alternative in some areas of the country, if 
similar public hospital bans were in place.52  Again, there was 
no suggestion that the Constitution might require private 
physicians or facilities to provide abortions, thereby ensuring 
access to the procedure.  No doctor or hospital, public or 
private, then, has the constitutional obligation to participate in 
an abortion procedure. 
It follows that because emergency contraception may act as 
an abortion procedure, there is no constitutional obligation of 
any state or private actor to provide access to emergency 
contraception.  This makes the drug neither illegal nor 
unconstitutional, but it does mean it is constitutionally 
permissive for businesses, public and private, as well as 
individual pharmacists and employees, to deny emergency 
contraception to their customers. 
III. THE CONCURRENT LIMITATIONS ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONTRACEPTION 
The use of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence to 
support the argument that pharmacists have no obligation to 
dispense emergency contraception requires that one accept the 
premise that emergency contraception is abortifacient.  Even if 
that premise is rejected, the Court’s jurisprudence outside of 
the abortion context still supports the conclusion that 
pharmacists are under no obligation to dispense emergency 
contraception. 
                                                          
 49.   See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 184, 197-98 (1973). 
 50.    432 U.S. 519 (1977). 
 51. See id. at 520-21. 
   52. See id. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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A.  THE COUNTERARGUMENT: EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION IS 
ORDINARY CONTRACEPTION 
There is no consensus among medical doctors that 
pregnancy begins at conception.  Instead, some doctors declare 
a woman pregnant approximately one week after conception, 
when the fertilized egg becomes implanted in the uterus.53  
Under this definition, when emergency contraception makes 
implantation in the uterus impossible, the pregnancy would be 
prevented, rather than terminated.  Instead of operating as an 
abortion, emergency contraception could not be differentiated 
from other types of contraception that prevent pregnancy. 
The definitional distinction of pregnancy’s beginning has 
been used to argue emergency contraception should not be 
examined in the abortion framework.54  Despite the 
ramifications that the distinction might have, not the least 
being the issue at hand, the Supreme Court has yet to address 
when a legal pregnancy begins.55  Lower courts, however, have 
made conjectures, favoring the “implantation” view over the 
“conception” view.56 
B.  LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO CONTRACEPTION 
Even if emergency contraception is not an abortion, it does 
not follow that one has a constitutional right for a prescription 
to be filled at any pharmacy of one’s choosing.  Although there 
is an unquestionable constitutional right for access to 
contraception in the United States,57 there is no precedent 
suggesting any particular pharmacy or pharmacist is required 
by the Constitution to dispense contraception.  Griswold v. 
Connecticut58 struck down a state law that had forbidden the 
                                                          
 53. See, e.g., GRIMES & RAYMOND, supra note 2, at E-182. 
 54. See Schaper, supra note 9, at 8-9. 
 55. Id. at 8. 
 56. See, e.g., Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 190-92 (E.D. La. 
1980) (striking down a statute that defined pregnancy as beginning “after 
fertilization of the female ovum,” and holding that the definition was 
constitutionally vague and might include the morning-after pill); Brownfield v. 
Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 208 Cal. App. 3d 405, 408-13 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding that a Catholic hospital could not refuse to give information on the 
morning-after pill, as it did not fit within the scope of abortion). 
 57. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding a 
constitutional right to contraception); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438, 454-55 (1972) (striking down a Massachusetts statute that denied 
contraception access to unmarried individuals). 
 58. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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use of contraception and any third party assistance in its use, 
under the auspices of marital privacy.59  Seven years later, the 
Court extended the constitutional right to contraception to 
include distribution to unmarried individuals.60  More 
instructive than the rights conferred in these cases, however, is 
where the Court was silent: no mention was made of any 
obligation, pharmaceutically or otherwise, to carry 
contraceptive devices.  In short, one has a right to buy 
contraception so long as there is a location from which to buy it.  
The Constitution protects access, not accessibility. 
The third pertinent Supreme Court decision regarding the 
sale and purchase of contraception is the 1977 case, Carey v. 
Population Services International.61  There, a New York law 
permitted only licensed pharmacists to distribute or sell 
nonprescription contraceptives.62  In striking down the law, the 
Court was concerned with the “restriction of distribution 
channels to a small fraction of the total number of possible 
retail outlets render[ing] contraceptive devices considerably 
less accessible to the public.”63  Although a cursory glance at 
the cited language might suggest the Court would uphold a law 
forcing pharmacies to sell emergency contraception, as it would 
allow for greater access, such an interpretation takes the ruling 
out of context. 
The plaintiff in Carey was a mail order retailer of 
contraception.64  By granting the retailer the right to sell in 
New York, the Court broadened access by lifting a prohibition 
on entry into the market.  Contextually, protecting the rights of 
retailers to choose to sell contraception is much different than 
requiring retailers to sell a particular form of contraception.  
This latter scenario, parallel to the course suggested by 
emergency contraception access advocates, grossly perverts the 
constitutional right to contraception beyond its true scope.  The 
constitutional right prevents the state from restricting one’s 
access to contraception.  This right falls short of mandating any 
particular retailer, including a pharmacy, to sell the products. 
IV. SHIFTING THE CONTROVERSY: STATE-MANDATED 
                                                          
 59. Id. at 485. 
 60. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 441-43. 
 61. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 62. Id. at 681. 
 63. Id. at 689. 
 64. Id. at 682 n.2. 
KRIESEL_FINAL 01/09/2006  12:42:18 PM 
2005] CONSCIENCE BEHIND THE COUNTER 347 
 
DISPENSATION 
Even if the Constitution grants no right to emergency 
contraception access, the legitimate arguments for free 
accessibility remain.  Most fundamentally, a pharmacist’s 
refusal to provide a legal prescription for a drug burdens the 
patient-doctor relationship, in which patients are able to 
control their health care decisions.65  Moreover, specific to the 
drug in controversy, expedient access is critical when the drug’s 
effectiveness decreases seventy-two hours after intercourse.  In 
geographic areas with few drugstores, a woman denied access 
to emergency contraception in one pharmacy may be completely 
denied of the opportunity to use the drug altogether.66  Perhaps 
more worrisome, among the many victims of rape who may 
become pregnant each year in the United States, barriers to 
emergency contraception access would require such victims to 
choose more intrusive methods for dealing with a pregnancy.67  
In response to these concerns and the probable lack of a 
constitutional right to guaranteed access to emergency 
contraception, state legislatures have attempted to exercise 
their own powers to compel access to the drug by enacting 
“must-dispense” laws.68 
A. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. 
SMITH 
These “must-dispense” laws have their own constitutional 
ramifications.  For instance, many pharmacists refuse to 
dispense emergency contraception due to religious beliefs.69  
For those who accept emergency contraception as abortifacient, 
religious teachings in opposition to abortion create conflict.70  
                                                          
 65. See Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe Is Not 
Enough: When Religion Controls Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725, 727-
28 (2004). 
 66. See Sanchez, supra note 4, at A10 (reporting the concerns of Sarah 
Stoesz, president of Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota). 
 67. See Schaper, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
 68. See Davey & Belluck, supra note 5, at A16 (reporting that California, 
Missouri, and New Jersey each had such proposals).  In addition, similar bills 
had been proposed on the federal level, in both the House and the Senate.  Id. 
 69. See Mike Rutledge, Pharmacist Sues over Abortion Pill, CINCINNATI 
POST, Aug. 13, 1999, at 1A, 10A. 
 70. Some religions explicitly oppose abortion.  For some Christians, the 
following verse is cited: “Before I formed you in the womb I knew you.  [B]efore 
you were born I dedicated you . . . .”  Jeremiah 1:5 (St. Joseph).  For Roman 
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Indeed, cooperation in an abortion may even lead to 
excommunication in the Roman Catholic Church.71  Such 
conflict with religion implicates the free exercise clause of the 
First Amendment, which prohibits laws that impede the free 
exercise of religion.72 
The Supreme Court established the framework for free 
exercise challenges in Employment Division v. Smith.73  The 
Court proclaimed the “mere possession of religious or religious 
convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political 
society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of 
political responsibilities.”74  The Court held that the “right of 
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 
comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on 
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that 
his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”75 
On the face of the Smith standard, the conscientious 
pharmacist’s argument seems to fail.  A law that requires 
dispensation of valid prescriptions for emergency contraception 
is “neutral” in the sense that it is presumably not written in 
animus toward a specific group of pharmacists, and it is of 
“general applicability” because it applies to all pharmacists, 
regardless of religious belief.  Instead, the impetus behind the 
law is to ensure access to the drug.76 
                                                          
Catholics, “[h]uman life must be respected and protected from the moment of 
conception.  From the first moment of existence, a human being must be 
recognized as having the rights of a person – among which is the inviolable 
right of every innocent being to life.”  CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: 
WITH MODIFICATIONS FROM THE EDITIO TYPICA 606 (Doubleday 1997) (1994).  
Islam also explicitly opposes abortion.  See Hassan Hathout, Abortion – 
Contraception – Sterilization 3-5 (2002), 
http://www.eufobio.org/~upload/religion/texte/Islam_abortion.pdf (providing 
Islamic teachings on abortion, including that the act is a sin, meriting punitive 
measures). 
 71. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 70, at 606. 
 72. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 
(1940) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the First 
Amendment). 
 73. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 74. Id. at 879. 
 75. Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). 
 76. See Dirk Johnson & Hilary Shenfeld, Swallowing a Bitter Pill in 
Illinois, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 25, 2005, at 28 (reporting that Illinois Governor 
Blagojevich, after issuing an edict requiring pharmacists to dispense 
emergency contraception, stated that his reason was to enable women to fill 
birth control prescriptions quickly and without hassle). 
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The Smith Court, however, articulated an exception to the 
standard to account for previous cases that struck down 
seemingly neutral and generally applicable laws that 
encroached on the free exercise clause.77  In defining the so-
called “hybrid” exception,78 the Court said the First 
Amendment only bars neutral, generally applicable laws that 
implicate the “[f]ree [e]xercise [c]lause in conjunction with 
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and 
of the press.”79  Thus, in order to challenge the must-dispense 
law on the basis of the Smith standard, a pharmacist must 
state a constitutional claim in addition to the free exercise 
violation. 
The First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause80 is the 
most viable argument.  The Court has interpreted the freedom 
of speech to include expressive conduct.81  A pharmacist who 
refuses to fill a prescription may be expressing many ideas 
through her conduct, including the belief that emergency 
contraception is abortifacient, as well as the more general belief 
that abortion is morally wrong.  Withholding the drug, 
however, is not conduct, but rather refraining from conduct.  
And, in Wooley v. Maynard,82 the Supreme Court stated that 
“the First Amendment . . . includes both the right to speak 
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. . . .  The 
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are 
complementary components of the broader concept of 
‘individual freedom of mind.’”83 
Even if the refusal to dispense emergency contraception 
constitutes speech, the plaintiff pharmacist must still raise a 
viable freedom of speech claim in order to challenge a must-
                                                          
 77. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith 
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1990) (speculating that the reason for 
the exception was to distinguish Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in 
which the Court discussed the constitutional right to direct the religious 
upbringing of their children, as well as the free exercise clause). 
 78. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. 
 79. Id. at 881.  The federal courts of appeals have split on how the hybrid 
exception should be applied.  See Jonathan B. Hensley, Comment Approaches 
to the Hybrid-Rights Doctrine in Free Exercise Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 119, 
128-37 (2000). 
 80. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 81. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); see also R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
      82. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 83. Id. at 714 (1977) (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
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dispense law.  First, for conduct to be protected under the First 
Amendment, it must be communicative.84  The Supreme Court 
has promulgated a two factor inquiry for communicative 
conduct: intent to convey a particularized message and 
likelihood that the message will be understood by those 
receiving it.85  This analysis will be factually dependent upon 
the individual pharmacist who withholds a prescription for 
emergency contraception.  In a First Amendment claim, she 
would have to prove both that she intended to let the customer 
know that, in her opinion, emergency contraception is morally 
wrong, and, second, that it is likely the customer understood 
why the drug was denied. 
If the conduct is found to be communicative, a state may 
still regulate the conduct if it has sufficient justification.  The 
Court allows incidental limitations on those First Amendment 
freedoms if the government articulates a sufficiently important 
interest.86  The state has an important interest in ensuring 
some access to contraception for women,87 and in the context of 
emergency contraception, the state might argue this is 
particularly true for victims of rape.  The restriction on the 
First Amendment freedom implementing the state’s interest, 
however, must be no greater than is essential to further that 
interest.88  Accordingly, a plaintiff pharmacist might argue that 
the scope of a must-dispense law should contemplate the 
availability of other pharmacists within the plaintiff’s 
pharmacy, as well as other pharmacies within a geographical 
region, that might alleviate the need for the plaintiff to 
dispense emergency contraception. 
A must-dispense law that requires a conscientious 
pharmacist to distribute emergency contraception, then, 
appears to be at least a candidate for a hybrid claim under the 
Smith framework.89  The result of such a claim, however, has 
                                                          
 84. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974). 
 85. See id. at 410-11. 
 86. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
    87. A state, for example, may not pass a law prohibiting the sale of 
contraceptives, as it would impinge upon the freedom to choose contraception.  
See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687-88 (1977).  Therefore, it 
is likely both within the constitutional power of the state, as well as an 
important governmental interest, to ensure women have access to 
contraceptives. 
    88. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 89. But see McConnell, supra note 77, at 1121-22 (opining that the 
exception was articulated by the Court only to distinguish Yoder and was not 
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become difficult to predict, as the Supreme Court has neither 
clarified the hybrid exception since its original pronouncement, 
nor granted certiorari to a case whose outcome depended upon 
the doctrine.90  This ambiguity has resulted in a split in the 
federal circuit courts of appeals, ranging from not recognizing 
hybrid claims at all, to requiring an independently viable 
constitutional claim when invoked.91 
It is far from clear whether a pharmacist challenging a 
must-dispense law could succeed.  This is not to suggest there 
are no further protections for conscientious pharmacists, but it 
could mean reliance on the legislative branch rather than the 
judiciary. 
B. LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES 
In a state that passes a must-dispense law, pharmacists 
opposed to emergency contraception still have legislative 
recourse.  In Smith, the Court acknowledged that political 
accommodations could be made for religious groups that would 
otherwise be subject to a neutral law of general applicability.92 
Furthermore, in a jurisdiction that has not passed a must-
dispense law, legislation can be enacted to protect pharmacists 
who are conscientious objectors.  So-called “conscience clauses” 
or “refusal clauses”93 grant a pharmacist legal permission to 
refuse to dispense a drug that violates her conscience.94  Four 
                                                          
meant to be taken seriously in future cases). 
 90. See Hensley, supra note 79, at 119, 127-28 (citing the only two 
Supreme Court cases that mentioned the doctrine, Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), and City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), neither of which clarified its application). 
 91. Compare Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(calling the hybrid exception “illogical” because if there is an independent 
viable constitutional claim, then there is no need to combine it with an 
inviable free exercise claim) with EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 
467 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 
F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (recognizing the possibility of hybrid claims).  See 
generally Hensley, supra note 79, at 128-37. 
 92. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).  To 
illustrate, the Court cited states that chose to except the sacramental use of 
peyote from their drug restrictions.  Id. 
 93. See Fogel & Rivera, supra note 65, at 727. 
 94. For example, the American Pharmacists Association wrote the 
following clause: “APhA recognizes the individual pharmacist’s right to 
exercise conscientious refusal and supports the establishment of systems to 
ensure patient access to legally prescribed therapy without compromising the 
pharmacist’s right of conscientious refusal.”  AMERICAN PHARMACISTS ASS’N, 
REPORT OF THE 2004 SESSION OF THE APHA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (2004), 
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states have already passed these clauses in some form, and 
there are legislative proposals in at least twelve other states.95 
Conscience clauses, in other forms, have been upheld 
against establishment clause challenges in the past.96  A 
further benefit for conscientious pharmacists is that conscience 
clauses are not explicitly religious, allowing pharmacists 
without a free exercise claim to cite their clinical role as part of 
the “health care team” as a reason to withhold dispensation of 
emergency contraception.97  Such pharmacists believe they are 
jointly responsible, with the prescribing physician, for every 
prescription dispensed; similar to physicians, then, these 
pharmacists argue that they should receive full protection of 
the law, even when exercising their moral and ethical 
convictions.98 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite compelling policy arguments on both sides of the 
emergency contraception debate, it appears constitutional law 
favors the pharmacist’s conscientious objection to dispensing 
emergency contraception.  Whether or not emergency 
contraception is considered abortifacient, the Constitution in no 
way demands emergency contraception to be available at any 
retail drug store the consumer chooses.  Consequently, 
supporters of forced drug access cannot rely on the 
Constitution. 
The viability of a legislative alternative is also in doubt.  
Until the Supreme Court clarifies the hybrid exception 
articulated in Smith, must-dispense laws will remain 
susceptible to free exercise challenges.  In that case, the 
likelihood of having a prescription filled will depend not only 
                                                          
http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/Co
ntentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=2472. 
 95. See Davey & Belluck, supra note 5. 
 96. See, e.g., Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 310-
12 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding a federal law that prohibited courts from using a 
hospital’s receipt of federal money as a justification for requiring those 
hospitals to perform sterilizations that conflicted with their religious beliefs). 
 97. See Koch testimony, supra note 11 (“Pharmacists have worked very 
hard to be considered partner’s in the health care team.”); Noe, supra note 6 
(“You don’t need a pharmacist at all if you’re going to just require them to 
dispense medications.  That takes away their clinical role.” (quoting Susan 
Winckler, Vice President of Policy and Communications for the American 
Pharmacists Association)). 
 98. See Koch testimony, supra note 11. 
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upon state law and the individual pharmacist, but also upon 
each respective circuit’s recognition of the hybrid exception.  
The constitutionality of conscience clauses, where passed, is 
less in doubt, providing assurance for conscientious 
pharmacists in those states. 
Undoubtedly controversial and contentious, the debate 
between free access to emergency contraception and the 
pharmacist’s conscientious objection will continue to incite 
litigants, lawmakers, and lobbyists.  Pharmacists may take 
solace in the debate’s legal implications, however, for there is, 
indeed, room for conscience behind the counter. 
 
 
 
